Glossary entry (derived from question below)
English term or phrase:
counterfactuals
English answer:
conditional propositions of the form \"If cause A were not true, effect C would not be true\".
Added to glossary by
Danila Moro
Mar 22, 2015 10:29
9 yrs ago
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English term
counterfactuals
English
Medical
Philosophy
Campbell's conception on causality in mental life
Second, there is, on this view, also no reason to think that causal links within the psychological domain need to be intelligible. As long as the right kind of interventionist counterfactuals hold between two mental states, the first one can causally explain the second one, irrespective of whether there are any intelligible connections between them.
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Change log
Mar 22, 2015 10:46: Danila Moro changed "Field (specific)" from "Psychology" to "Philosophy"
Responses
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Selected
conditional propositions of the form "If cause A were not true, effect C would not be true".
Counterfactuals means propositions, as explanations of causality, of a conditional form: A causes C if it is the case that if A were not true, or had not occurred, C would not be true or would not have occurred. In other words, they are counterfactual in the sense that they posit a hypothetical situation that is contrary to the facts: A does in fact exist/has in fact occurred/is in fact the case; what would follow if it did not/had not/were not?
This type of reasoning was first articulated by David Hume: "We may define a cause to be an object followed by another [...] where, if the first object had not been, the second never had existed."
Thus in terms of a causal relationship between two mental states, mental state A causes mental state C if, in the absence of mental state A, mental state C would not exist. The counterfactual holds if this is the case: if it is true that state C would not exist in the absence of state A.
Campbell is saying that if such conditional counterfactual propositions hold, we can say that the mental states are causally connected, but the connection does not need to be intelligible: we do not need to be able to understand rationally why, in the absence of A, C would not exist.
There is a very good, clear explanation of counterfactual theories of causation here:
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/causation-counterfactual/
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Note added at 2 hrs (2015-03-22 13:23:31 GMT)
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It might have been clearer if I had put "If the first mental state did not exist, the second would not exist" in the answer box.
This type of reasoning was first articulated by David Hume: "We may define a cause to be an object followed by another [...] where, if the first object had not been, the second never had existed."
Thus in terms of a causal relationship between two mental states, mental state A causes mental state C if, in the absence of mental state A, mental state C would not exist. The counterfactual holds if this is the case: if it is true that state C would not exist in the absence of state A.
Campbell is saying that if such conditional counterfactual propositions hold, we can say that the mental states are causally connected, but the connection does not need to be intelligible: we do not need to be able to understand rationally why, in the absence of A, C would not exist.
There is a very good, clear explanation of counterfactual theories of causation here:
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/causation-counterfactual/
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Note added at 2 hrs (2015-03-22 13:23:31 GMT)
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It might have been clearer if I had put "If the first mental state did not exist, the second would not exist" in the answer box.
Peer comment(s):
| agree |
Patricia Fierro, M. Sc.
9 hrs
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Thanks, Patricia :)
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| agree |
Veronika McLaren
23 hrs
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Thanks, Veronika :)
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4 KudoZ points awarded for this answer.
Comment: "thank you very much for your clear and exhaustive explanation."
Discussion
Digressing somewhat, I think Campbell would exclude from "delusions of reference" Chesterton's example that, if one believes one is a poached egg, then it is perfectly logical to want to sit on a piece of toast. There, the delusion is not referential - given the premise, the conclusion is not delusional.
And there I leave it.
Exactly what "interventionist counterfactuals" are I am not entirely sure. But since Campbell's interventionism, as shown by the passage you have quoted, means the idea that by changing the cause you change the effect, I think it may well mean propositions of the form "If we intervened in such a way that mental state A did not exist, mental state C would not exist either".
[On my] analysis, for one belief to be the cause of another is for intervening
on the first belief to be a way of changing the second. Suppose you believe:
(1) that this man is stroking his chin, and
(2) that this man believes you need a shave.
[…] What is it for the first belief to be a cause of the second? On the interventionist analysis, it is for intervention on the first belief to be a way of changing whether you have the second belief."
So, it's not as extreme as 1984 Doublthink "holding two contradictory beliefs in one's mind simultaneously, and accepting both of them". But it's heading in that direction, a type of "holding two unrelated beliefs in one's mind simultaneously, and accepting one as being causative of the other"
"Counterfactual sentences describe what might have been, not what is going on. In other words, the information provided by counterfactuals does not change the protagonist's here-and-now, and should not contribute to situation updating. However, given the dual meaning of counterfactuals, readers could momentarily consider counterfactual information as if it were "real." ... We predict that, immediately after reading a counterfactual sentence, readers will keep accessible both a factual (p & q) and a counterfactual (not-p & not-q) interpretation of the events."
It seems to me that it is this broader definition of a "counterfactual" that is in play here.